In a recent 6-3 decision, in the case of Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme Court has overturned a Fourth Circuit decision which granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, in regards to their failure to grant Plaintiff reasonable accommodations under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Specifically, Plaintiff was a pregnant postal service worker who was told by her Doctor that she should not attempt to lift more than 20 pounds while pregnant. However, since the postal service often requires employees to lift up to 70 pounds, Plaintiff required an accommodation during her pregnancy. When Defendants refused to accommodate Plaintiff and refused to allow her to continue working while pregnant, Plaintiff sued alleging pregnancy discrimination.
Initially, the District Court granted Defendant’s request for summary judgment, holding that Plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas standard. To meet this standard, Plaintiff had to show that she belonged to a protected class, she sought an accommodation, her employer failed to provide an accommodation, and that her employer previously accommodated other employees with a similar inability to work. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden would shift to the Defendant to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for denying accommodations. This would then shift the burden back to Plaintiff to show that the employer’s provided reasons were just pretext for unlawful discrimination. Plaintiffs can prove pretext through evidence showing that Defendants policies impose a significant burden on pregnant women, and their employer’s reasons are not sufficiently strong enough to justify the burden. Here, Plaintiff provided examples of multiple individuals with similar work restrictions whom Defendants had previously accommodated. She claimed that they failed to provide her with a previously used “light-duty-for-injury” policy that they applied to numerous other persons. However, the District court held, and the Fourth circuit later affirmed, that those with whom Plaintiff compared herself, employees who were covered under the Americans with Disabilities Act, were injured on the job, or had lost Department of Transportation certifications, were too different from her to satisfy the “similar inability to work” factor of the McDonnell Douglas standard.
On appeal, the Supreme Court instead found that the Fourth Circuit glossed over the question of why Defendants could not accommodate Plaintiff’s pregnancy when they had previously accommodated many other similar physical limitations. The Supreme Court did not go so far as to accept Plaintiff’s argument that as long as an employer provides any employee with an accommodation, it must provide a similar accommodation to pregnant women irrespective of the nature of their jobs, their employees needs, or other important criteria. However, the Court did find that there was a material dispute as to why Defendants provided reasonable accommodations to other employees and not to Plaintiff for her pregnancy. Accordingly, the case has been remanded to the Fourth Circuit, who must determine whether Plaintiff created an issue of material fact as to whether Defendants reasons for treating Plaintiff less favorably than it treated other nonpregnant employees was merely pretextual.
The New York City employment lawyers at Fitapelli & Schaffer, LLP have a strong track record in the successful litigation of pregnancy and disability discrimination cases. We hope and believe that this decision makes it possible for the countless women suffering from pregnancy discrimination to receive the accommodations they deserve. If you believe that you have been subjected to employment discrimination, please contact us at (212) 300-0375 or visit our website at www.fslawfirm.com