On June 24, 2013, Plaintiff Katherine Albin filed suit against her employer Thomas Pink, Inc., her employer\u2019s parent company LVMH Moet Louis Vuitton and two senior managers, alleging that she failed to receive a promotion at work due to discrimination against her on the basis of a recent pregnancy. Plaintiff\u2019s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, New York State Executive Law and New York City Human Rights law arose after Plaintiff returned from a three month maternity leave and expressed interest in a resigning manager\u2019s position. Albin v. LVMH Moet Louis Vuitton, Inc., et al., <\/i>No. 13-cv-4356 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014). Between November 2011 and March 2012, Defendants sporadically met with Plaintiff to interview her for the position, during which Defendants were noncommittal about the length of the interview process. Defendants informed Plaintiff on March 6, 2012 that a different candidate had been hired for the position. Plaintiff alleges that this new manager had less relevant experience than Plaintiff, had not worked in several years, had previously only worked at the Hamptons branch as opposed to the New York City branch, and was of an age at which it was unlikely she would have a child now and in the future.<\/p>\n
On October 24, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a prima facie<\/i> case of pregnancy discrimination. The court opined that the parties were arguing over the outdated McDonnell Douglas <\/i>legal standard which requires that a plaintiff establish: (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the position; (3) she was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.\u00a0 The court explained that in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A.<\/i>, the Supreme Court rejected the application of a heightened pleading standard for establishing claims under the McDonnell Douglas <\/i>test. However, following the pleadings standards initiated in Twombly <\/i>and Iqbal<\/i>, there has been disagreement in the Second Circuit as to Swierkiewicz\u2019s<\/i> viability. The court felt it unnecessary to address the dispute as it determined that the Plaintiff had sufficiently stated a claim of employment discrimination under both the Swierkiewicz<\/i> standard and the more stringent McDonnell Douglas<\/i> framework.<\/p>\n